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On a probabilistic definition of time 
 
Alberto Bicego 
(albertobicego@libero.it) 
 
A mechanism is proposed that allows to interpret the temporal evolution of a 
physical system as a result of the inability of an observer to record its whole state 
and a simple example is given. It is based on a review of the concepts of 
information, entropy and order. It is suggested that the temporal evolution and the 
choice of the “initial state” depend on the way the observer “compresses” 
information. 
 
Introduction. 
 
Carlo Rovelli has recently returned [1] on an issue repeatedly addressed in the past [2−5], 
namely on the advisability to introduce the concept of time in quantum gravity. His answer is clear: 
“The answer I defend is that we must forget the notion of time altogether, and build a quantum 
theory of gravity where this notion does not appear at all.”  
The “problem of time” is central for any attempt to combine general relativity with quantum 
mechanics, as is clear at least since Wheeler-DeWitt’s equation was proposed, but the positions on 
its possible solution are very different [6, 7]. However, even if one does not want to adhere to the 
position of those who consider time an indispensable ingredient in any physical theory [8], it is 
obviously necessary that this concept can be found at least as a result of some process of limit − 
similar to the classical limits of relativity or quantum mechanics − or may emerge in some 
particular situation. The mechanism proposed by Rovelli to recover the notion of time is a 
thermodynamic origin [1, 2]; Julian Barbour [9, 10] suggests that it is our brain, through certain 
structures of the universe that he calls time capsules, to give us the illusion of a passing time, just 
like a movie projector from a set of frames. 
In addition, in an attempt to address some unsolved problems, such as the collapse of the 
wave function, Rovelli reaches a reformulation of quantum mechanics based on information theory 
[11, 12]. 
I fully endorse the opinion that time is not something flowing someway outside the universe, 
but it is the result of an interaction between the universe and our brain. I am also convinced that 
information theory should play an important role in physics not only, for example, in order to obtain 
quantum computers, but at a more fundamental level; an opinion, moreover, already expressed even 
more categorically, amongst others, by J.A. Wheeler [13]. I can’t say, of course, whether Rovelli’s 
or  Barbour’s ideas will actually lead eventually to a consistent and complete theory of quantum 
gravity and I will not deal with this problem. I’ll just show how, in some cases, a notion of time can 
be derived from the probabilistic nature of information recording. According to Anderson’s 
classification [7], I should say that, rather than the “problem of time mismatch”, I’ll address the 
problem of the “arrow of time”. 
Entropy. 
 
I must begin by saying that I will use the terms entropy and information in Shannon's 
original meaning [14], although there is still a vigorous debate on their meaning and in particular on 
the possible relationship between different definitions of entropy in various fields. [15−17]. 
So, consider an event that can be realized in N different ways xi, each with probability  pi.  
Shannon defines entropy of the set p1, …, pN  
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where k is arbitrary and I have chosen 2 as base of the logarithm, to have the bit as information unit. 
If we have no knowledge at all about the event, we shall  give to all the results the same probability 
Np /1= and therefore 
(2) NkH 2log=  
Let us now consider a physical system S. The system S can be known by an observer O 
through a series of measures that determine its state. The observer O can consider S as the set of 
possible outcomes of the measurement process.1 Since we are interested in some kind of record of 
the state of S, we consider a state of S as specified by a certain number, call it s, of bits (the number 
of possible states of S will therefore be N = 2s ). 
We shall call measure any physical interaction between S and O because of which S will be in a 
state x and O in a state X. Ultimately we can consider a measure as a function OSm →:   from S to 
O.  
In principle, if the number of bits available to O  to carry out the measure is at least equal to s, a 
measure could be a bijection, so that a state of S is uniquely specified by one of O’s, but it is clear 
that in most cases it will not be so: think of a gas, whose state is specified by the knowledge (at 
least) of the positions and moments of all particles, while measures allow us to know only the 
macroscopic parameters. 2  We’ll call micro-states the states x of S and macrostates the states X of 
O (also O  will be the thought of as the set of its states). No ambiguity will arise if we call  
macrostate also the set of microstates corresponding to the same state of O, i.e. m−1(X); we can thus 
say that Xx ∈  and call microstates belonging to the same macrostate  equivalent. The way in which 
O takes its measurements allows us therefore  to build in a natural way a partition on S. 
Suppose now that O addresses the problem to predict the outcome of a measure: he will give 
each state a probability p(x) of showing up. x is therefore a random variable and it is possible to 
introduce for it an entropy in Shannon’s sense: 
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where the sum is extended to all states of S. 
If O does not know anything about the system S, he will have no reason to assign different 
probabilities to the various microstates, so in the absence of information about the system S, 
(4) ksNkxH == 2log)(  
It should be noted (as Shannon says explicitly) that H, in this approach, is not in any way a function 
of the state x, it is simply a number describing the amount of information that the observer O has on 
the system S: in the case of minimum information, it is equal, up to a constant, to the number of bits 
used to describe a state of S. 
Assuming now that the result of a measurement has been X, O will be interested to know in which 
microstate S is. Again, in the absence of other information he will assign to all microstates 
corresponding to X the same probability 
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 One may wonder if S is actually something more than this, i.e. whether it has an existence independent of  O’ 
observation (“The notion rejected here is the notion of absolute, or observer-independent, state of a system; 
equivalently, the notion of observer-independent values of physical quantities.” Rovelli in [11]), but we will not deal 
with this problem. 
2
 In fact, the existence of a much larger number of states of the system than is possible to measure, is supposed by  us on 
the assumption that the gas is made up of particles; it is therefore shareable the  definition given by Rovelli [11], who  
regards the state of a system as the maximum amount of information one can get from it.  
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where I called )( Xxp  the probability that the state of S is x conditioned by the fact that the  
measurement result is X and w, according to custom, the multiplicity of the macrostate X. Therefore 
(6) )(log)( XwkXxH =  
It is (6), not (2) that must be interpreted as Boltzmann’s equation. A value of H is therefore 
associated with each macrostate X, but we can also associate this value with each state Xx ∈ , so 
that we can consider H as a function defined on S, although not bijective. We shall therefore write 
H(x). This function tells us that the higher the multiplicity of the macrostate X to which x belongs, 
the lower the information on the system S that O  has gained by the measurement: only if w = 1 
does O  know with certainty the state of S. 
The meaning of H is here precisely that of information theory, since S can be regarded as a signal 
source, O the destination and the measuring instrument the channel; so that O, receiving the 
message X, will raise the question of what the original content x is. 
It should be noted that in this approach the definition of entropy makes sense only in 
reference to a specific observer and has no meaning for the system itself. Different observers can, 
in principle, construct different entropy functions in relation to different ways of grouping states 
together. 
Time evolution. 
 
Identifying the time evolution of a system means, first of all, being able to order its states, 
i.e., given two states, say which comes first. All the classic examples make use of an idea like this: 
one imagines a camera that records the state of the system and notes that he can easily tell whether 
the movie runs forward or backward. 
It must therefore be possible to establish a function which associates with each state of the system a 
value t of a real parameter. In fact, the function may not be injective, since all we can measure are 
the macrostates. It is unavoidable the temptation to nominate entropy itself as a possible “time” of 
the system; but any increasing function of H will do. That solves the problem of ordering the states 
of S, but still it is not enough. 
It is usally said that a physical system evolves naturally over time so as to increase its 
entropy as it passes from less probable  states to more probable ones. Actually we are referring, of 
course, to macrostates, the only ones we can really observe. 
The idea underlying this explanation of the temporal evolution is that all microstates are equally 
likely and so it seems natural that the temporal evolution goes in the direction of increasing 
multiplicity. On closer reflection, however, this view appears to be an undue extension of the 
fundamental axiom of statistical mechanics. The axiom of microstates equiprobability concerns 
only states of equilibrium and excludes the possibility of temporal evolution; indeed, statistical 
mechanics completely ignores the idea of time. “Statistical mechanics, however, does not describe 
how a system approaches equilibrium, nor does it determine whether a system can ever be found to 
be in equilibrium. It merely states what the equilibrium situation is, for a given system” (Kerson 
Huang in [18]). 
Besides, it does not justify the observation that evolution is progressive: if we observe that a system 
at a given time is in a state with low multiplicity (not likely), we can also expect  that at a later 
moment the system state belongs to a macrostate with higher multiplicity, but this hardly explains 
why the steady state is reached gradually. If all microstates are equally likely, why is the system not 
in a state of high multiplicity immediately after the first measurement? 
It seems to me that a system could present a time evolution only if its states are not equally 
probable. It’s impossible to attribute a time evolution to a system, if, at any time, it has the same 
probability of being in any microstate; the idea of time evolution is inextricably linked to a gradual 
change. 
 So, let's see how we can introduce a time in S. 
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We will need the following ingredients: 
 
• a partition of S into macrostates, as described above, with these features:  
 there is a subset O 'of O in which different macrostates have different multiplicity, so 
that 
(7) )()( jiji XHXHXX ≠→≠  
  there is a state '0 OX ∈ , which we’ll call initial (macro)state, having  
(8) 0)( 0 =XH   
and thus multiplicity 1. We’ll call initial (micro)state also )( 010 Xmx −= ; 
• a bijection +⊂→ RIOt :  which is an increasing function of H;  
from (6) follows that t takes its minimum value in X0: we’ll set 
(9) 0)( 0 =Xt  
• a function ]1;0[: →× IOp   with these features: 
 for each value of t,  p is a probability function defined on O; in particular we’ll have 
therefore: 
(10) ∑ =
O
tXp 1),(   for each fixed t (the sum is over all the macrostates of O);  
 initially the system is certainly in x0: 
(11) 1)0,( 0 =Xp   
 for each fixed X the function ),( tXp  has one maximum in )(Xttm = : 
(12) ( ) ( )XttttXp mm =↔=),(max  
 
In this case we’ll say that t is a time for the observer O in relation to the set of states O’. 
It may seem strange that t is a function defined on O and not on S, but remember that the 
states of S are inaccessible to O: all he can know are the macrostates X. 
t can anyway be traced back to be a function on S as follows: 
(13) ( ))()( xmtxt =  
Of course )(xt  is not an injective function. 
Also p  can be made to be a function on IS × , defining 
(14) ),()(
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In this way the probabilities of two microstates belonging to the same macrostate are the same and 
each one reaches the maximum at the same t of the corresponding ),( tXp . 
We can therefore speak of a time for S, but we must not forget that this makes sense only in 
reference to an observer O: an observer that constructs different macrostates might observe a 
different time evolution. 
An example. 
 
It may seem that the proposed mechanism is artificial and complicated, but we’ll see an 
example in which the above procedure reveals simple and effective. 
Consider a system S whose state x is specified by a number s of bits. We can imagine a state of the 
system as a series of boxes s filled with 0 and 1. Suppose we are not able to record a full state x, but 
only the number n of zeros it contains. The number n specifies then the macrostates of the system. 
The multiplicity of n is 
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and the corresponding entropy 
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O  is, for us, the set of values of n. Observe that there are different values of n with the same 
multiplicity, e.g. n = 0 and  n = s. But if we consider { }2/|' snnO <= , then all the macrostates have 
different multiplicity and H is an increasing function of n.  
Let’s introduce now the function  
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and  p is an arbitrary parameter between 0 and 1/2 (excluding extremes). Let’s introduce, besides, 
the function3 
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It is easily verified (see  Appendix 1) that (7−12) are satisfied. 
Note that S does not have, per se, any intrinsic notion of time, but the way in which O stores 
the states of S, i.e. the way in which he makes a measurement, authorizes us to consider the function 
t a time for O. He will observe that by making a measurement on S he will have a different 
probability of obtaining the various states while the “time” t is changing. As an example, I show in 
Figure 1 some values of ),( tnp . The system, therefore, according to O, “evolves” from the initial 
state in which  all the bits have value 1 to a final state in which half of the bits (as a limit value, 
since for n = 10 the curve has no maximum) are 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The probability for O of finding n zeros depends on the “time”. The system thus “evolves” from an 
initial state where all the bits are 1 to a final state in which half of the bits are 0. In this graph 
I have set p = 0.06 and s = 20, with s number of zeros and p is a scaling factor for t. 
 
 The “trajectory” of S, as seen by O, can be obtained simply by inverting (17): 
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 One might wonder where these functions come from. I derived them for an earlier work that was not published. This 
does not matter at all here: we shall take (17) and (18) as simple definitions: their adequacy will be justified by the 
results we obtain.  
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The parameter p plays the role of scale factor for t, and determines, therefore, its unit. 
 One might think that this is an entirely abstract contruction and that S does not evolve at all, 
however, this model describes just one of the examples that are used to explain the meaning of 
entropy and time evolution: the urn model, proposed in 1907 by P. and T. Ehrenfest [19]. This is a 
box divided into two parts; initially only one of them contains a number s of particles; the box is 
shaken and every second a particle has a probability p of jumping on the opposite side. Assignining 
to the compartment which initially contains the particles the value 1 and to the other 0, the system is 
described by s bits that specify the position of each particle. The time evolution is precisely that 
described above, which we derived considering solely how O  stores the information about S.  
Order and reversibility. 
 
 Let’s try to understand better the relationship between information and temporal evolution. 
It is usually said that a system evolves spontaneously from order to disorder. States of low entropy 
are considered ordered and states of high entropy disordered. You can take the example of a deck 
of playing cards, originally prepared “in order” and then mixed repeatedly. Everyone knows that, 
while in theory possible, in practice there is no hope of finding the initial state again. We need an 
external intervention to prepare the system in this state, after which the system, if we let it “evolve” 
spontaneously, will roll away from it relentlessly. Similar considerations were applied to the 
universe as a whole, inducing cosmologists to ask: “What forced the entropy of our world to be so 
low in the past? (...) To produce a universe similar to that in which we live, the Creator would have 
to aim at an absurdly small volume of phase space of possible universes” (Roger Penrose in [20]). 
However, returning to our example of the deck, we can ask why the initial state should be so 
special. Suppose that from an initial state, which we call x0, completely “ordered”, shuffling a large 
number of times we have come to a state fully “disordered”; in what are x0 and x1 different? All in 
all, if we mix, we will not expect to find x1 more than to find x0. Imagine turning the cards, which 
are in the state x1, face down and write on each one a progressive number; they appear now 
completely “ordered”, but if we restore x0 they will appear completely “disordered”. Why are we 
not willing to consider x1 as the initial state without writing the numbers on the back? The answer is 
that mixing from  x1 we would be unable to distinguish any evolution, because the states are all 
alike, or, more simply, because it is not easy to memorize x1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  A configuration in which few details emerge from a background, such as (a) or (b) is easier to memorize 
than one in which they become numerous, probably because in the process of recording we use a sort of 
“compression algorithm”, rather that store all the individual bits. 
 
As another example, consider Figure 2: it shows three different configurations of a 
hypothetical system specified by 20 bits. Try to look at each one for a few seconds and then try to 
recall them. It is quite obvious that while the first (a) is recorded immediately, the second (b) 
requires greater attention, while the third (c) is more difficult to remember. Generally we find it 
easier to recognize configurations in which few elements emerge from a homogeneous background, 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(a) 
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(b) 
 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
(c) 
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while, if their number grows too large, they tend to merge and become themselves an 
indistinguishable background. 
The reason is probably that in the process of storing our brain takes some strategy of “compression” 
to reduce the number of bits needed to reproduce the figure. We can, for example, imagine a 
strategy of this kind: we record the number of consecutive 0, starting from the first box, then the 
number of consecutive 1, then the number of 0 ... and so on, until the end of the boxes. You can see 
(Appendix 2) that this method is efficient when the 0s are “compact”, but it requires an 
exaggeratedly high number of bits when they are distributed evenly. It is then possible that our 
brain gives up a faithful storage, losing information on the system. We saw in the previous example 
that incomplete recording of the state of a system can lead to attribute temporal evolution. 
 Now imagine an object on a segment of length L; let Ll <<   be the smallest interval that we 
can appreciate, so that we can imagine our segment as a set of boxes that are occupied or empty; to 
fix ideas we will say that each box can be white or black. Suppose that our object is long nl 
( Lnll <<<< ) and fills n boxes. Then a state of our system can be described by lLs /=  bits -  
putting, for example, 0 where the box is black -  n of which are consecutive zeros. Of course we can 
use the compression algorithm described above, saving a large amount of memory. The 
representation of data, in this case is lossless, entropy cannot be defined, nor a time evolution for 
the system in the way described above. But if our object can be separated into particles of length l, 
the restriction that the zeros are consecutive disappears and data compression quickly becomes 
inefficient for configurations where the particles are finely distributed. It may be convenient then to 
give up a faithful memorization and use a probabilistic representation. For example, rather then 
referring to individual white or black boxes, we could build groups and consider, instead of the 
actual configuration of each group, the “degree of gray”, specified by the number of black boxes in 
the group. It is clear that the reconstruction of the system state will be approximate and we can only 
“guess” what it really is. In this case it should be possible, somehow, to introduce a time function 
for the system. 
 This would suggest that in those which are referred to as irreversible phenomena there is a 
loss of information due to failure to record completely the state of the system, while the ability to 
know fully the state of the system leads to reversible phenomena, for which it is not possible to 
identify any temporal order.  
Final remarks. 
 
 The observer O in our example, just because he stores information about S in a certain way, 
is led to introduce an order in the set of the states of S. He can associate with each state a number t 
and, choosing to use t as a time for the system, he will find that by making a measurement at a 
given time t, he will have a maximum probability of finding some (macro)state. It is easy to see, 
with a numerical simulation, that the maximum of Figure 1 become very sharp increasing the 
number of bits s, so that the temporal evolution of the system is well defined.  
This mechanism poses some problems, a few of which I will try to highlight. 
 
 Among the ingredients to build a time evolution I put a function +⊂→ RIOt : . It may 
seem that this means introducing a parameter from the outside, as in Newtonian physics and 
quantum mechanics. Actually, the central role is played by the function ),( tXp : it is 
maximizing it that you can identify the function t. But how can we find  ),( tXp ? In the 
example it was found, in fact, so as to reproduce the correct time evolution of the system 
under consideration. One may ask whether there is a general way to determine it. The 
problem seems somewhat similar to that of finding the action or Hamilton’s characteristic 
function: it is fairly easy, in some cases where one already knows the dynamics, to find 
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these functions, but it is not possible to find them in general, in order to derive the dynamic 
as a result. 
 
 I suggested that the temporal evolution, as a result of the grouping of states of S into 
macrostates, is due to the inability of our brain to record all the information contained in S. 
Can we hazard a psychological mechanism by which the feeling of time evolution takes 
place?  
Suppose we have a hundred strings like those shown in Figure 2, which we are required to 
reproduce after observing them for some time and that we get a reward for each 
configuration correctly reproduced. Where shall we start from? No doubt from those, such 
as  a  and  b, which we are able to memorize easily and with certainty, while we shall be 
induced to leave last those for which we can only make attempts. Can we accept that there 
be some sort of advantage in paying greater attention to unmistakable configurations and 
that we can interpret this as considering preceding? In this case Barbour would be right in 
saying that “it is our brain that plays the movie” [10], giving us the impression of passing 
time. 
 
 I insisted that the time evolution of a system depends on how an observer records the 
system. Consider a configuration in which the bits have alternate values: 010101010 ... Of 
course if we wanted to use the compression algorithm described above it would be a bad 
deal, but everybody will agree that this can be considered a “highly ordered” state, since it is 
very easy to memorize. It can easily be traced back to the case where the first half of the bit 
is 0, simply changing the order in which one counts the boxes. If we associate, as before, a 
black  box to 0 and white one to 1, we have a something that can roughly represent the 
diffusion of two liquids of different colors; it follows that if it is possible to identify for it a 
time evolution, it should also be possible to have a “reversed” evolution, starting from a 
situation in which the molecules of the two liquids are evenly distributed. But we must 
believe that this way of counting is not spontaneous, or it is not convenient for our brain. 
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Appendix 1. 
 
I’ll show that the example proposed satisfies the conditions (7−12). 
Since the initial macrostate is n = 0, (7−9) are immediate.  
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To prove (12) it suffices to annul the derivative respect to t of ( ) ( )ntnst bb −+ − 11  (or its logarithm) 
and note that  (17) follows. H  is an increasing function of t because w is an increasing function of n 
(for n < s/2) and n is an increasing function of t, as can be seen from (19) (remember that b < 1); its 
expression follows from (16) e (19): 
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Appendix 2. 
 
We want to memorize the state of a system of s bit. 
Consider the following “compression algorithm”: 
 
• read the first bit: if it is 0 write 0, if it is è 1, write 1; this requires 1 bit of memory 
• count the n0 consecutive bits equal to the first, write n0; since sn ≤≤ 01  (including the first 
bit), this requires about s2log  bits 
• count the next n1 consecutive bits different from the first one, write n1; since 010 nsn −≤≤   
this requires about ( )02log ns −  bits 
• count the next n2 consecutive bits equal to the first one, write n2; since 1020 nnsn −−≤≤   
this requires about ( )102log nns −−  bits 
• proceed until you finish the s  bits 
 
We have used in this way a number of bits 
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where c is the number of changes in the value of two contiguous bits and ∑
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In the sum (A2.1) the most important terms are those for which ∑
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c
ki
i sn , therefore roughly 
(A2.2)  san 2log1+≈  
where  a  is a number close to the number of groups of bits that are small. 
It is clear that this algorithm works well if the values are grouped into large homogeneous groups, 
otherwise it fails. We can find a limit setting in (A2.2) sn ≤  and solving for a;  ignoring 1 
compared to s, we find 
s
s
a
2log
≤ . 
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We can therefore say that when the bit value changes more than 
s
s
2log
 times, the compression 
method becomes useless, because we need more than s bits. 
Of course I do not want to maintain that the method described is that used by our brain to 
store information, but it is likely that it implements a compression algorithm of some kind and that 
when the space required becomes excessive, it prefers, as they say in computer science, a lossy 
procedure, reaching only a probabilistic knowledge of the system it is observing. 
Appendix 3. 
 
The system S considered in the example has no other feature than to be described by s bits. It could 
therefore represent any physical system. We can amuse ourselves by deriving a “cosmological” 
result, imagining that S represents the entire universe. We will base ourselves on two assumptions 
(not so easy to accept, indeed):  
• the multiplicity of the states represents somehow the “volume” of the universe; 
• our perception of time is somehow analogous to that which comes from knowledge of the 
“number of zeros” of the universe, so that we can use (15−19). 
From (15, 16) we have  
(A3.1)   kHw /2=  
We can obtain an approximate expression of H  using Stirling’ formula, xxxx −≈ ln!ln , that holds 
when n  and  s − n are large. We get: 
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where n is given by  (19). 
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Figure 3: Universe’s “volume” versus time (in arbitrary units). The universe undergoes a growth of many orders 
of magnitude, which brings it rapidly close to the maximum size, then slows down to become 
asymptotically stationary. Here the number s of bits that describe the universe is set equal to 100 and 
the parameter p, which determines the time scale, equal to 0.035; s determines the asymptotic value of 
the volume. 
 
Figure 3 is a graph of w(t). Curiously, in this model the universe would undergo a period of 
inflation, during which it grows many orders of magnitude, reaching almost the maximum volume, 
and then slow its expansion becoming asymptotically stationary. The instant when deceleration 
begins can be found annulling the second derivative of (A3.3), which is 
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where w is given by (A3.3) and n by (19). Annulling the term in parentheses one gets an equation 
that cannot be solved exactly in R. 
Though with this mechanism inflation arises naturally, probably it cannot be considered 
satisfactory, because, as Liddle says in [21], “it must come to an end early enough that the big bang 
successes are not threatened”. 
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